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WHY NOT "FINDINGS OF LAW'
AND
"CONCLUSIONS OF FACT"
AND
OPINIONS ABOUT BOTH?
NEVIN VAN DE STREEK

I.

WHY MUST FACTS BE FOUND - ARE THEY LOST?

One of the few disagreeable aspects of winning a bench trial is that
the judge will probably ask you to submit for his or her consideration
proposed "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order for Judgment." Who among scrupulous lawyers has not twisted in agony while
doing so because of uncertainty over whether a particular statement is a
finding of fact, instead of a conclusion of law, or vice-versa? (Of course,
the less than scrupulous lawyer is going to label nearly every statement a
"finding of fact" with the hope thereby of staving off a successful appeal.)
The practice of some trial judges-who insert boiler plate provisions in
their "findings" and "conclusions" to the effect that if an appellate court
finds one to be the other, it is, in its new guise, reaffirmed by the trial
judge-indicates to me that judges are likewise uncertain as to what sort
of statements belong in each classification. (Well, actually, I suspect that
some trial judges who follow this practice feel that they know quite well
what is a conclusion of law and what is a finding of fact, but they are
uncertain whether the appellate judges are as perceptive.)
So, in order to diminish my anguish over deciding what is a finding of
fact and what is a conclusion of law in the context of drafting something to
lay before the judge (which, alas, is an anguish to which I am not often
enough exposed), I have paid some attention over the years to what appellate courts say when they gently reprove a trial judge for "finding" when
he or she should be "concluding," or vice-versa. This makes for some
interesting reading. Indeed, I seem to recall a case which the North
Dakota Supreme Court handed down some years ago, which I cannot
now readily find, wherein the justice who wrote the opinion labored
mightily to establish that the trial judge had erroneously found something
to be a conclusion of law, when truly it was a finding of fact, whereupon
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1970, University of Michigan School of Law, (cur laude); A.B., 1967, Stanford University. Former
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the court proceeded to set aside the newly-christened finding of fact on
the grounds that it was clearly erroneous!
Some time ago, after a fair amount of such reading, I reached the
humbling conclusion that I am not very good at distinguishing between
findings and conclusions. Now, however, rather than living quietly and
uncomplainingly with that incubus, I have decided to cast it off. Hence, I
have written this viewpoint article to explore the following propositions:
(1) the law is very much misguided in attempting to observe a rigid (and
very artificial) distinction between "findings of fact" and "conclusions of
law;" (2) the net result of such effort is to sow a great deal of confusion
into the law, with a resulting loss in efficiency and gain in unpredictability;
(3) things would be improved, albeit perhaps only marginally, if the profession and judiciary openly acknowledged how seldom a pure finding of
fact is encountered, and how often the proper resolution of an issue is not
truly a conclusion of law, but rather a matter of opinion, although, to be
sure, an opinion influenced by the law.
II.

YOU JUST CAN'T SEEM TO GET A GOOD FACT ANYMORE
THESE DAYS.

In a typical lawsuit, there are very few "pure" factual issues or "pure"
findings of fact in which legal concepts play no part. In speaking of a
"fact" in this context, I mean to use the term as a historian or biographer
might use it, in saying, for example, that the Battle of Waterloo was fought
on June 18, 1815, and Napoleon's conduct of the battle was affected by ill
health. Facts in 'this sense are occurrences which are observable by the
senses; they are events which could be captured by a video camera.
By way of contrast to this use of the word "fact," when courts speak
of a finding of "fact," they frequently are not thinking exclusively about an
occurrence-like the Battle of Waterloo-which is discernable solely
through the use of the senses. Rather, they are referring to intangible
things like thoughts, emotions, and mental conditions which usually cannot be directly perceived by the senses, but which must be inferred.
(Admittedly, such inferences are drawn from some observable physical
manifestations of a thought, emotion, or mental condition.)
By way of illustration, let us assume that a judge or jury, after hearing
the relevant evidence, determines that on such and such a date Darwin
Debtor gave a promissory note and a mortgage on Black Acre to Matthew
Moneylender. Without more, most judges and lawyers, if asked to characterize that determination, would answer without hesitation that it was a
"finding of fact." If pressed to justify that opinion, they might respond
that such a determination seems to be pretty much equivalent to a jour-
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nalist's "who, what, when, where" lead paragraph (and everyone knows
that journalists deal in nothing but facts).
But really, this "factual" determination concerning Darwin Debtor is
heavily permeated by legal concepts. To put it somewhat differently, it
comes wrapped in an invisible gauze of assumptions concerning legal matters. A lawyer who is faced with this apparently simple statement will
more likely than not, and more or less unconsciously, make all of the following legal assumptions (and others I cannot think of): that the mortgagor was mentally competent, was not under duress, was not the victim of
fraud, was not a minor, was not laboring under a mutual mistake of fact,
was the owner of Black Acre, was not mistaken as to the identity of either
the land he was mortgaging or of the mortgagee, was not prevented from
mortgaging Black Acre under the homestead laws or because of some
other legal disability, executed documents which were unambiguous and
legally sufficient in form, received valid consideration for the giving of the
note and mortgage, and was not engaged in a sham transaction to defraud
his creditors.
Indeed, one need only look at the multitude of interlocking and complex provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code which define a "negotiable instrument" to conclude that it is somewhat misleading to label as a
finding of fact the statement that "A gave B his promissory note."
I contend that the only "pure" findings of fact in a typical lawsuit are
those which involve everyday concepts not drawn from legal lore. Examples include a finding that "the defendant's car drove through a red light
when it collided in the intersection with the plaintiffs truck" or that "the
plaintiff gave birth to a child in December of 1991." All other determinations should be recognized as being infused or alloyed-to a greater or
lesser degree-with legal concepts. Obviously this is not a novel notion,
as courts have often noted the existence of "mixed questions of law and
fact."' What I contend, however, is that the scope of such "mixed questions" is vastly larger than is usually acknowledged, and indeed, that
"pure" issues of fact are quite rare in lawsuits, other than, perhaps, those
suits involving personal injury tort claims.
III.

THERE'S GOT TO BE A DIVINE PURPOSE HERE
SOMEWHERE.
A.

JURIES NEED CORRALS.

Once it had finally dawned on me that, apart from tort claims, most
lawsuits only rarely involve pure issues of fact, I began to wonder why the
1. See 9 CHARLES A.
CIVIL § 2589 (1971).
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law so assiduously strives to achieve some sort of compartmentalization
between findings of fact and issues of law. There must be at least an
intuitive feeling among jurists, if not a fully articulated theory, that worthwhile goals or purposes are being accomplished by the effort. One such
goal which occurred to me is to achieve a proper division of labor
between the trial judge and the trial jury when it comes to deciding the
various issues raised during a jury trial. Surely, thinking in terms of
"issues of fact" and "issues of law" would assist in accomplishing that goal,
because, after all, juries are supposed to decide the former and judges the
latter.
Yet, the more I thought about that proposition-that conceptualizing
issues in a lawsuit as being either "factual" or "legal" assists in dividing
responsibilities between judge and jury-the more doubtful I became
about its validity. Ultimately, I concluded that the categories of "factual
issues" and "legal issues" should not be all that important in determining
what gets put to the jury and how.
B.

BUT

WHERE TO BUILD THE FENCES?

The problem of deciding what belongs to the jury and what belongs
to the judge is presented most acutely when a new statute is applied for
the first time, particularly when the statute is broadly phrased. One has
to wonder what the federal trial judges thought when they were first
handed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.2 As originally enacted, the first sentence of Section 1 read as follows: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."' The second sentence went on to provide that anyone who made
a contract or who entered into a combination "hereby declared to be illegal"4 was guilty of a felony.
In theory, a felony prosecution could have been brought under the
Act in which the judge would have charged the jury somewhat as follows:
The defendant is charged with violating the Sherman Act. The
Act declares to be illegal "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce." You have heard the evidence against the defendant. How do you find, guilty or not guilty, under the Sherman
Act?
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Of course, I doubt whether any prosecution which employed such cursory
jury instructions has ever been brought under the Sherman Act. Quite
the contrary. The courts have amplified and explicated the Act with
detailed, complicated, and somewhat abstruse doctrines and rules which
find their practical expression in the form of lengthy and detailed jury
instructions.
And this brings up an interesting point. If a judge gives detailed and
comprehensive jury instructions relating to the substantive law to be
applied by the jury (as opposed to "housekeeping" instructions), the judge
is staking out a relatively large perimeter surrounding the "legal" issues
which the jury must not cross. The preserve left to the jury, finding the
"facts" of the case, is correspondingly diminished. This follows because
ordinarily the more detailed and comprehensive the instructions, the less
discretion the jury enjoys to "make law" by applying its own notions as to
what the statute really says, or as to what elementary fairness requires.
Unfortunately, courts don't tell us practitioners much (in fact, hardly
anything) about how they decide (1) the extent to which a jury should be
allowed to make its own determination as to what a statute really means
and (2) the extent to which that burden or privilege is to be taken from
their hands by means of the preemptive effect of jury instructions.
Maybe the reason judges are so mum on the subject is because they seldom think about how they do what they do, they simply do it. Because
there is no body of law or established doctrine which attempts to set forth,
as a general proposition, how trial courts are supposed to distinguish
judge issues from jury issues, trial judges are left largely to their own intuition about such matters.
There is a reason, in my opinion, why no generally recognized rule of
thumb exists to distinguish jury issues from judge issues. Under the present scheme of things, such a rule must attempt, implicitly or explicitly, to
distinguish between findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to be
consistent with the supposed rule that juries are assigned fact issues, and
judges are assigned legal issues. But such attempted distinction is so
unrealistic and unworkable, because of the amalgamation of fact and law
earlier noted, as to make it impossible to devise a sensible and workable
rule.
C.

AND BUILDING A STRAIGHT FENCELINE ISN'T SO EASY.

The needless and frustrating complexities which result from attempting to artificially distinguish between findings of fact and conclusions of
law is illustrated by Woodall v. City of El Paso.5 Woodall was a jury trial
5. 950 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1992).
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which involved a relatively rare form of challenge to the sort of zoning
ordinance which regulates the location of adult businesses. Although lawsuits challenging such ordinances are common, such suits usually do not
involve a jury because only injunctive or declaratory relief is requested.
Even when damages are sought, the plaintiff in most instances is inclined
to waive a jury on the theory that the judge is more likely than a jury to
disregard the rather unsavory and unpopular nature of the plaintiffs business. In Woodall, the damages issue went to a jury.6 (The party requesting the jury is not indicated in the opinion, but perhaps the defendant
City wanted a jury trial for the same reason that the plaintiff would not.)
A claim triable to the jury having been raised, the trial judge had to
wrestle with framing jury instructions which would properly present the
appropriate issues of fact to the jury. One First Amendment issue arising
in any adult zoning case is whether the zoning unduly restricts public
access to adult materials. The Supreme Court created this "undue
restriction on access" or "adequate access" issue in the Young v. American
Mini Theatres7 case, in which it first upheld the constitutionality of
restrictive zoning of adult entertainment centers, by noting that the particular ordinance it was then reviewing did not have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech."8
Of course, whenever the Court makes an observation that the record
does, or does not, disclose a particular situation or certain circumstances,
and indicates further that the state of the record in that regard is significant, the Court generates a potential issue for future similar cases. Unfortunately, issues thus created often do not parse easily into "issues of fact"
components and "issues of law" components. So it was in Woodall with
regard to applying the "not unduly restrictive" test of Young. Is the test
ultimately an issue of law to be decided by the trial judge? Or is it an
issue of fact? Or, alternatively, is the test sufficiently an issue of fact (recognizing, as most courts do, that some issues are "mixed" issues of law and
fact) to be put to the jury? In short, how is the jury supposed to handle, if
at all, the "not unduly restrictive" test?
The Woodall trial court addressed this problem by instructing the
jury with an excerpt from the Supreme Court opinion in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.9 In Renton, the Court rebuffed an argument that the
Renton, Washington, ordinance flunked the unduly restrictive test.10 The
resulting Woodall instruction read thus:
6. Woodall v. City of El Paso, 950 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
7. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
8. Woodall, 950 F.2d at 259 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35
(1976)).
9. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
10. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
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[flor the purpose of determining whether acreage or sites are
"reasonably available," you are instructed that adult entertainment businesses must fend for themselves in the real estate
market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers
and lessees. Acreage and sites are not "unavailable" solely
because they are already occupied by existing businesses, or
because "practically none" of the undeveloped land is currently
for sale or lease, or because in general there are no "commercially viable" adult entertainment sites within the area which
complies with the ordinance. Although the First Amendment
guards against the enactment of zoning ordinances which have
"the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to lawful
speech," the First Amendment does not compel the City of El
Paso to insure adult entertainment businesses, or any other kind
of speech related businesses, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices. 1
The judge also used a special verdict form, i.e., "special interrogatories" on the "reasonable access" issue.12 The jury found that under the
various ordinances being challenged, the City made 1165 acres of land
available on which 59 new adult businesses could operate, in addition to
the 39 such businesses already operating. 13 In so finding, it rejected in
part both the City's and the plaintiffs' evidence on the "reasonable access"
issue. 4 The jury also found that the ordinances did not deny the plaintiffs "a reasonable opportunity to open and operate their adult entertainment businesses."15 The appellate court recites this procedural history
and then goes on to make the somewhat murky remark: "The district
court upheld the Ordinances' constitutionality pursuant to the jury's
verdict."

16

This remark is murky because it could be read as saying the judge
entered a judgment in favor of the City as a ministerial act based on the
jury verdict (as is the practice in federal court in which the judge and not
the clerk of court enters the judgment). Or, it can be read as saying that
the judge used the jury's findings as the basis for reaching a conclusion of
law, after applying the appropriate legal principles to the facts thus found.
In any event, the appellate court reversed the lower court's decision
on the grounds that the jury instruction quoted above provided insufficient guidance to the jury on the "reasonable access" issue. Later, the
11. Woodall, 950 F.2d at 257.
12. Id. at 262 n.6.
13. Id. at 257.

14. Id. at 262.
15. Id. at 257.
16. Woodall, 950 F.2d at 257.
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appellate court issued a curious opinion 17 in which it withdrew some of
the discussion in its earlier opinion with regard to the applicable legal
principles which should be brought to bear on the reasonable access
issue. At the same time, it also expanded somewhat on its holding as to
what additional instructions the jury should have been given.'"
Specifically, the instructions that the trial court should have given,
according to the Woodall appellate court, was that in considering the
availability of land within the community on which to open and operate an
adult entertainment center, the jury should disregard land with physical
characteristics that render it unavailable for any kind of development or
with legal characteristics (restrictive covenants) that exclude adult businesses.' By not fine-tuning its definition of "unavailable" land, the trial
court, in the eyes of the reviewing court, allowed for the possibility that
the jury would find land to be "available" which, as a matter of law, was
"unavailable." 20
My point in discussing Woodall at length is not to claim that it was
rightly or wrongly decided in either court, but rather to illustrate that
there is something seriously amiss in our system, or lack of system, in
deciding what issues are jury issues and what issues are judge issues.
Here we have a situation where the United States Supreme Court has
announced a legal principle in one case, the "no undue restriction of
access" principle, and then expounded on the principle at length in a later
case. One would think, and perhaps the Woodall trial judge thought, that
since the Court has "laid down the law," one need only give the Court's
exposition of the law as a jury instruction and that any issues not directly
addressed therein are, almost by definition, issues of fact to be decided by
the jury.
Yet, the Woodall appellate court tells us that this isn't so. By implication, the circuit court is saying that at least in this instance, the Supreme
Court paints only with a broad brush, and consequently, the trial courts
must fill in many details with a fine brush. I have no quarrel with trial
judges being required to do so. My concern is that the fine brush work
tends to get smeared by the erroneous, but widely proclaimed, notion that
legal disputes divide more or less readily into distinct issues of fact and
issues of law.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 304 (1992).
Id. at 1306.
Id
id.

1994]

VIEWPOINT

IV. JURIES DON'T NEED CORRALS; THEY NEED CASTING
DIRECTORS.
Cases like Woodall convinced me that an attempt to recognize and
preserve a dichotomy between legal issues and factual issues (1) did not
provide much practical assistance to a trial judge or trial counsel in drafting jury instructions intended to present only issues of fact to the jury, and
(2) did not sufficiently explain why, in a given instance, an appellate court
would reverse a trial court for giving "insufficient" jury instructions. So I
began to ponder the possible effects on the foundation of the Republic if
the courts suddenly disavowed the supposed dichotomy between legal
issues and factual issues. What if they said that instead of there being a
division between law and fact, there was a continuum with law on one end
and fact on the other? How would that affect the manner in which judges
go about drafting jury instructions?
Well, it might lead to an assignment of responsibility between judge
and jury based upon a functional analysis as to what a jury does better
than a judge, and vice-versa. In that connection I cannot help but recall
an observation that I have often made to myself (although I am sure it is
not original with me): that lawyers and judges allow a jury to decide only
those issues which are too difficult for the lawyers and judges themselves
to decide. These issues are usually notions of "fairness" or "reasonableness" and the like. Few would dispute that issues of this sort should continue to be given to the jury to decide. Also, of course, the jury should be
expected to continue to discharge its traditional function of assessing the
credibility of witnesses.
So if the decision in a case looks like it is going to turn mainly on a
question of whether someone acted "reasonably" under the circumstances
or whether a party is telling the truth, the instructions should be crafted
so that the jury passes on those issues. Admittedly, as matters now stand,
juries routinely handled such issues as a matter of tradition and practice.
But what should be done in novel and complex cases like Woodall,
where the respective provinces of jury and judge are not staked out by
centuries of tradition? That case presented a difficult "mixed issue of fact
and law:" whether the particular zoning ordinances under review afforded
the public the minimum access to adult materials mandated by the First
Amendment. What elements of a complex mixed issue of fact and law
like that presented in Woodall are issues for the court to decide as a matter of law, and which issues must the court foreclose the jury from tampering with, by means of the jury instructions it gives?
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The answer I offer is that courts should try to fashion jury instructions in such a manner that the jury is left to deal with three broad categories of issues.
The first category would consist of the "who really said or did what to
whom" issues, which as suggested previously could be called biographer's
or historian's questions. In other words, we are speaking of "pure" issues
of fact, such as whether the traffic light was red in the direction of the
defendant when she drove into the intersection and struck the plaintiffs
car. If the answer to that single question will essentially decide the case, a
general verdict rather than a special verdict would be used. But if the
case is more complex, such as one involving a claim that the defendant
violated the federal anti-discrimination in employment laws by maintaining a "hostile working environment" for members of the plaintiffs protected class, the jury would be asked to decide by way of special verdict,
for example, whether the plaintiffs supervisor really called him a "dumb
honky," as the plaintiff complains.
The second category would include issues calling for the jury to exercise as the surrogate for the community from which it is drawn, the community's sense of fairness, reasonableness, meetness, and proportion. An
example would be when the issue is whether someone was "negligent" or
"reckless" under all the facts and circumstances of which the jury has
been made aware.
The third category of jury issues would consist of those arising when
someone is asked to look into a fellow human's soul. Consider the case of
the man who, in the middle of the night, shoots his wife dead as she
returns from the bathroom to their bedroom. Did he do so because he
mistook her for an intruder, as he testifies, or because he wanted to be rid
of his wife, as the prosecution seeks to show? This is the sort of "soulsearching" issue the jury should decide. (I grant that this category is
really only a subcategory of the first category, but it sounds more dramatic
this way, and law review articles are sorely devoid of drama.)
The judge would be obligated to decide the remaining questions,
sometimes in the form of a memorandum opinion based on the jury's
special verdict findings, and sometimes in the form of jury instructions.
Obviously, this approach would not be a panacea for the problem
inherent in dividing responsibilities between judge and jury, which I
claim is a problem needlessly worsened by the effort to maintain an artificial barrier between findings of fact and conclusions of law. Yet, it would
be an improvement, I contend. At least it is worth a try. Thus, in a case
like Woodall, for example, I hope the judge would make an analysis somewhat like the following before drafting the jury instructions:
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I realize that the issue as to whether a zoning ordinancewhich restricts the location of adult entertainment centersallows constitutionally sufficient public access to adult materials,
is not an issue the average citizen grapples with each morning
while commuting to work. It is an artificial concept, a construct
of First Amendment law. It is my duty as a judge to translate a
rather abstract and sweeping observation made by the Supreme
Court, to justify in part its broad and far-ranging announcement
of a new doctrine of law, into composite legal principles, and
then to incorporate these legal principles into appropriate jury
instructions which create concrete issues of fact which the jury
can decide. I must give the jury the opportunity to use the everyday skills, abilities and common sense that we judges, usually
with good cause, attribute to jurors.
The central question in this case is whether a new adult
entertainment center can find a location in El Paso on which to
operate its business with sufficient profitably to justify its staying
open, even if under the challenged ordinances it might not be
able to generate as much profit as it could if the ordinances did
not exist.
Therefore, rather than requiring the jury to grapple with
cumbersome, abstruse and somewhat nebulous questions which
would require them to reason like a town planner or real estate
developer-such as how many additional adult entertainment
centers could theoretically open in the community, or how
many acres of land are theoretically available for such development-I am going to instruct the jury that in order for the
plaintiff to prevail, he/she must convince the jury that he/she
made a reasonably exhaustive effort in good faith to find a suitable location in which it could operate in conformity with the
ordinances, with sufficient profitability to justify staying open,
but that ultimately it was unable to do so.
'Framed in this fashion, the jury issues in Woodall become ones to
which the jurors can more easily apply their common sense, community
values, and lessons of every day experience. They can pass judgment on
whether the plaintiffs officers are testifying candidly when they recount
in detail the various location searches they conducted. They can decide,
assuming that they accept such testimony, that the efforts thus described
were "reasonably" exhaustive. They can decide whether the rejection by
the plaintiff of certain available sites, as offering too slim a prospect of
profit, was "reasonable" under the circumstances. In fact, on that last
point, expert testimony is not necessarily called for. If the plaintiff's
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officers testify that they rejected a site because it showed no reasonable
prospect for profitable operation, the jury members can assess the believability of that statement from their own personal impressions of the witnesses "in the flesh." In so doing, they will be operating no differently
than a jury in a tort case which is called upon to assess the trustworthiness
of a statement by a witness that he saw the green Buick before the collision and that it was traveling at a very high rate of speed."'
V.

AN OPINION ABOUT OPINIONS LACKING OPINIONS.

Of course, if the supposed distinction between issues of law and
issues of fact were abandoned as a guideline to identifying jury issues, the
question would inescapably arise whether the distinction would be worth
preserving in bench trials. 2 That judges have to be "ordered" by way of a
formal rule to set forth their decisions by means of "separate statements"
of "findings" and "conclusions" tends to indicate that it is not a practice
which comes to them naturally.' But if the rule requiring "separate
statements" serves a useful purpose, then undoubtedly it should be
retained and enforced. Its purpose is touched upon in Rule 52(a) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure in the following sentence: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses." 24 There is no doubt, then, that the requirement that
findings of fact and conclusions of law be stated separately is to assist the
appellate courts in their review of lower court decisions. It is intended to
indicate to them where they should tread more carefully.
However, if the purpose sought to be accomplished by the "separate
statement" rule is not being accomplished, and perhaps is not even being
earnestly pursued, then should we bother retaining a rule which has such
a purpose? Particularly, should we do so when meaningful compliance
with the rule is difficult at best? True, appellate courts contend that they
give greater deference to a finding of fact made by the trial judge than
they do to a conclusion of law, at least when they agree that it is a factual
21. To be sure, even under these instructions the adult bookstore plaintiff is going to have a
difficult time with the jury because of the nature of its trade, but no conceivable instruction which the
trial judge might give on the "reasonable access" issue is going to help it on that sore point. The best
the judge could do under the circumstances would be to give the jury some sort of cautionary
instruction, unless the plaintiff thought it would do more harm than good, and otherwise the question
of jury prejudice would have to behandled during jury selection.
22. Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure says in pertinent part: "In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . ." N.D. R. Cirv. P. 52(a).
23. Many, perhaps most, judges hand down their decisions by way of a memorandum opinion,
which they expect winning counsel to covert into formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, as was
alluded to at the beginning of this viewpoint.
24. N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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finding. They do so in recognition of the greater ability of the trial judge,
having heard the witnesses in the flesh, to make determinations of the
witnesses' credibility (meaning thereby both truthfulness and persuasiveness). Some go so far in their zeal on this point that they purport to apply
the "clearly erroneous" standard to factual findings made by a trial judge
in a case in which there are no live witnesses, only documentary evidence. 25 No doubt these courts would say that the "separate statement"
rule has a purpose, that it is a valid purpose, and that the purpose is being
accomplished.
Nevertheless, I am skeptical. First, as stated above, I am convinced
that most "findings of fact" are suffused with legal concepts in the first
place. This makes it difficult to meaningfully divide "law" from "fact" and
it makes it easy for appellate judges to relabel "fact" as "law," so as to
allow the "clearly erroneous" standard to be disregarded. Second, I am
enough of a cynic to think that if, for example, a court is reviewing a case
in which the only evidence is documentary and if it thinks the factual
findings of the trial judge based thereon are incorrect, it will apply a
watered down variety of the "clearly erroneous" rule without acknowledging that it is doing so. Even so, I will concede that because of the "clearly
erroneous" standard or because of the reasons behind it, frequently an
appellate judge will stay her hand and vote to affirm a decision, largely
factual in nature, which she would be loathe to hand down if she were the
trial judge. I will also concede, for all the conventional reasons advanced
in support of such a conclusion, that this is a good thing.
It is far from clear to me, however, that this good thing would be
seriously jeopardized if we abandoned the rule that findings of fact must
be labeled such and separately stated from the conclusions of law, which
also must be labeled as such. Even in the absence of separately stated
findings of fact and conclusions of law, I suspect that a reviewing court
can get a pretty fair impression from the record and from the judge's
remarks, written or oral, as to the degree the judge's decision turned upon
his or her assessment of relative credibility and upon his or her reading of
the nonverbal communication which occurred in court.2 6
If I am correct in this supposition, then perhaps instead of using or
purporting to use two different standards of review, depending upon
whether an issue is one "of fact" or "of law," an appellate court should
25. The courts which take this position, which I find extreme, cannot justify it on the grounds
that the trial judge has a greater ability to make credibility determinations. Their rationale seems to
be that trial judges, by virtue of the experiences of their office, have better developed "fact finding'
muscles (or noses) than do appellate juages, and so should be deferred to while acting as fact finders.
26. One need only read a transcript of a deposition which one did not attend in order to be
struck quite forcefully by the importance of nonverbal communication. Oddly enough, reading a
transcript of a deposition one did attend seems to convey the same message even more forcefully.
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adopt a sliding scale standard of review. Under this standard, the more a
trial court's decision on a particular issue appears to have turned upon a
determination of the relative credibility (meaning again both truthfulness
and persuasiveness) of the witnesses, the more reluctant the court should
be to second-guess the trial judge. To be sure, this is probably what
already happens informally (and perhaps unconsciously) to a very large
extent, because as I keep harping, there are very few "pure" issues of fact
in most lawsuits.
Such a sliding scale would not really be that foreign to the workings
of the North Dakota Supreme Court, for it readily characterizes certain
issues as "mixed questions of fact and law" when it suits its purposes to do
so. (Note, however, that trial judges don't ordinarily have a "Mixed Questions" section in their "Findings" and "Conclusions," nor does Rule 52(a)
of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate such a beast.)
Although I certainly haven't studied the point thoroughly, it seems to me
intuitively true that the state supreme court is most likely to discover such
a "mixed question" when it wants to reverse the trial judge. I can't ever
recall seeing a case in which the state supreme court transformed a trial
judge's "finding of fact" or "conclusion of law" into a "mixed question,"
and then proceeded to affirm.
For example, in First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart,27 the trial

judge was reversed when the supreme court found a "mixed question"
presented by the issue whether a guarantor had consented to certain
replacement notes being substituted for his original obligation.' Further,
in Earth Builders, Inc. v. State,2 9 the trial judge was reversed (over a very
strong dissent by a trial judge sitting on the supreme court by designation), when the supreme court found a "mixed question" on the issue
whether the state highway department had entered into an option to
purchase gravel in good faith and without notice of the rights of a prior
gravel lessee under an unrecorded lease.' The dissent asserted quite
persuasively that under traditional criteria (which criteria would be moot
under my proposal for a merger of "law" and "fact"), the ultimate issue
presented was an issue of fact. 3 '
Conversely, in cases which seem to present an issue which is begging
for elevation to the esteemed status of being a "mixed question," such
promotion is denied if the decision being reviewed is affirmed. In Slope
County v. Consolidation Coal Co. ,32 the question presented was whether
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

267 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1978).
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart, 267 N.W.2d 561, 564 (N.D. 1978).
325 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1982).
Earth Builders, Inc. v. State, 325 N.W.2d 258, 260 (N.D. 1982) (Garaas, D.J., dissenting).

Id.
277 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1979).
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a corporation owned more agricultural land than the amount then permissible under the North Dakota anticorporate farming law.3 The permissible amount was ". . . such as is reasonably necessary in the conduct of [the
owner's] business..." What is remarkable about Slope County is not so
much that the court found the ultimate issue to be an issue of fact (since,
after all, it affirmed the trial court), but the manner in which it applied
the "finding of fact" label. The court stated:
Except for the rule that the purpose and objective of the corporation must be taken into consideration, there are no rules of
law applied in determining if land is reasonably necessary in the
conduct of a corporation's business. Such a determination is
arrived at only by an examination of evidence, including the
inferences drawn therefrom. Accordingly, we conclude such a
determination is a finding of fact ..
The court did not explain why, if the purpose and objective of the
corporate landowner must be taken into consideration, and if the process
of so doing involves the application of a rule of law, no "mixed question"
was presented. Moreover, there was an even more pressing reason why a
"mixed question" might properly be found to exist, which the court
ignored. That is, when the Legislative Assembly enacted the
anticorporate farming law, it must have had some public policy considerations in mind, as it did also when it enacted the "reasonably necessary"
exception. Should not these considerations properly guide and inform the
decision-maker in determining how much land is "reasonably necessary"
to the purposes of a landowner who seeks to invoke the exception? If so,
is not a "mixed question" inescapably presented? ,
Intriguing as this point may be, the particular merit of Slope County
is a delicious passage therein which does more-unintentionally-to persuade the reader about the inutility and artificiality of the distinction
between findings of fact and conclusions of law than I can accomplish in
pages of argument. It reads as follows:
The parties disagreed if the. determination of whether or
not land is reasonably necessary in the conduct of a corporation's business is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law.
Because this distinction becomes important in determining our
standard of review, we find it necessary to examine the question.
In reaching our determination, the following statement by the
33. Slope County v. Consolidation Coal Co., 277 N.W.2d 124,125 (N.D. 1979). North Dakota's
anticorporate farming law was provided in N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06 (repealed 1993).
34. Slope County, 277 N.W.2d at 126 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-03).
35. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court of Oregon in Henzel v. Cameron is particularly
relevant: "Whether a finding is a 'finding of fact' or a 'conclusion
of law' depends upon whether it is reached by natural reasoning
or by fixed rules of law. Where the ultimate conclusion can be
arrived at only by applying rules of law the result is a 'conclusion
of law.' A 'finding of fact' is a conclusion drawn by way of reasonable inference from the evidence."
Thus, it has been said that if facts are undisputed and only one,
if any, inference can reasonably be drawn from those facts, the
determination of that inference is a question of law. When,
however, facts are not in dispute but permit the drawing of different inferences, the drawing of one such permissible inference
is said to be a finding of fact. Findings of fact are the realities as
disclosed by the evidence as distinguished from their legal effect
or consequences. 36
If, as Slope County attempts to teach us, the process of finding facts
not only requires "natural reasoning" but also leads to "realities," then, by
Jove, we lawyers want no part thereof. On the other hand, perhaps a
greater hospitality to "mixed questions" would be beneficial.
An open proclamation that deference to the decision of a trial judge
is a matter of degree, with the degree of deference being a function of the
amount of "facts" which seem to infuse the case, could perhaps lead to
more candid and realistic arguments being made to appellate courts, and
to those courts making more candid and realistic decisions. There is a
criticism implicit in my last statement. The criticism is that at times, by
labeling certain issues as issues of fact and by purporting to apply the
"clearly erroneous" test to such issues, an appellate court is not being
candid with itself and with the bar as to what it is actually doing. Moreover, by using the rhetoric of "factual findings" and "clearly erroneous,"
the court is forcing advocates before it to speak in the same terms,
although the decision under review may involve an instance in which the
judge is not so much (or at least not entirely) finding "what happened" as
the judge is deciding, as a matter of good policy and fairness, what ought
to be done about "what happened."
What I have in mind specifically is the position taken by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in domestic cases, in which the court almost invariably observes that decisions of trial judges on issues of child support,
spousal support, an equitable division of property, and child custody,
involve matters of fact and, hence, are subject to the "clearly erroneous"
36. Id. (citing Henzel v. Cameron, 365 P.2d 498, 503 (Or. 1961)) (citations omitted).
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rule. To be sure, such issues are very "fact intensive," and the ability of
and the necessity for the trial judge to make numerous credibility evaluations indicate that great deference is due to the trial judge's resolution of
such matters. It goes too far to say, however, that the ultimate issue is
essentially one of fact. Is it really proper to say that the process of deciding which parent should be awarded custody of the children can be
viewed essentially as being on the same plane and as being an exercise of
the same character, as the process of deciding whether at a certain time
and place the light was red for the driver of the Chevrolet station wagon?
The latter process concerns itself with an objective investigation of
observable physical phenomena. The former process concerns a more or
less subjective investigation of intangible and immeasurable matters, like
character, temperament, aspirations, sympathies, and personal failings.
More importantly, not only is the former predictive and the latter historical in perspective, but also the former requires the judge to make ad hoc
moral judgments on behalf of society which are not called for in the latter.
Deciding child custody is basically an attempt on the part of the
judge to predict as best he or she can which parent will provide the better
environment and example for the children during that uncertain period of
time when the custodial parent will have an influence on their lives. It is
somewhat akin to predicting today who will be the Super Bowl winner
five years hence. But even this analogy fails. Today's prediction as to the
winner of a future Super Bowl eventually can be shown to have been
correct or incorrect when made. But the correctness of child custody
decisions are seldom testable in the same manner. If, contrary to the trial
judge's hopes and expectations, 'A' performs miserably as a parent, does it
follow that the judge made an "incorrect" decision? How can we know
with certainty that 'B' would have done any better? In view of all the
considerations detailed above, how can the award of child custody legiti38
mately be called "an issue of fact?"
To be sure, the issue of child custody may often be factually intensive. Its ultimate resolution may be based upon the construction of a
mosaic, each tile of which is fashioned by the judge's separate weighing of
the witnesses' relative truthfulness and competence on one disputed point
or another. Yet, except in those cases in which one parent has acted like a
beast and the other surely will be a candidate for beatification, the ulti37. See, e.g., Kraft v. Kraft, 366 N.W.2d 450, 453 (1985).
38. Similarly, it is difficult to accept the contention made repeatedly by the North Dakota
Supreme Court that a trial court's decision as to what constitutes an equitable property division
between divorcing spouses is a "finding of fact." Equity, like beauty or merit, is in the eye of the
beholder. Do we find as a verifiable "fact" that Mozart was a greater composer than Beethoven, or
that orange juice tastes better than apple juice?
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mate conclusion as to which parent is the fitter is essentially a matter of
opinion.
It is a matter of opinion, in part, because as just demonstrated, it is
not really a finding of fact. Nor is it really a conclusion of law. Implicit in
a conclusion of law is the notion that the judge is not consulting his or her
own belief as to what makes up a "just result" in a given situation. Rather,
the judge is deferring to the view of the lawmaker, expressed as a rule of
law, as to what justice requires under the circumstances. Thus, a judge
may believe personally that the "race to the courthouse" system of filing
adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code often works an injustice, but
the judge enforces the system because "it is the law." In a child custody
case, the judge is supposed to award custody in the manner consistent
with the "best interests" of the children. Does anyone suggest seriously
that in being obligated to follow this principle, a trial judge is forced to
subordinate his or her own will to that of the lawmaker? Or that a judge
left to his or her own devices might follow a "worst interests" rule? Can it
be contended fairly-in view of the generality, amorphousness, and subjectivity of the "best interests" test-that such test is a rule of law in the
sense that the Uniform Commercial Code "race to the courthouse" rule is
a rule of law?
If an award of child custody is neither a finding of fact nor a conclusion of law, it must be something akin to an opinion. Why can't welawyers and judges-say that? Why can't we say that some things are not
really findings of fact, or at least not entirely so, and that they are not
really conclusions of law, or at least not entirely so, and that it is not really
satisfactory to call them "mixed questions of fact and law," but rather they
are, by golly, matters of opinion? Having so stated, appellate courts could
openly profess to act, or attempt to act, or actually act, in one of two ways.
Under the first alternative, the upper courts would say something
like the following:
As the decision under review essentially involves a matter of
opinion, and as one person's opinion is usually as valid as
another's, we should be extremely chary about substituting our
collective opinion for that held by the trial judge. Consequently, we should employ a standard of review similar to the
"rational basis" test which is used in reviewing the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of statutes which regulate economic affairs. Under that standard, an economic
regulation will not be invalidated if the reviewing court can conceive of any rational basis for its enactment. Under our "award
of child custody" version of the rational basis test, we are not
going to overrule a trial judge unless the appellant can show us
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(1) either explicitly or by implication the judge found certain
material facts to be true, and (2) the evidence bearing on those
facts was such that no rational person, not even a judge, could
have found them to be true, and (3) in the absence of such facts
no rational person would have awarded custody as did the trial
judge, or (4) in the alternative, the appellant must show us that,
accepting the judge's view of the facts as he or she must have
viewed them, the decision was one which no rational person
would have made.3 9
Under the second alternative, in recognition that one judge's opinion
is a decidedly small sample of the communal wisdom concerning that
about which he or she opines, and thus could be rather aberrant, the
appellate court could say:
Because a decision as to child custody is essentially a prediction
of future events, and thereby really a matter of opinion, we will
(albeit reluctantly) reverse a trial judge's decisions about such
matters when it appears to us that, after assuming the facts to be
as the trial judge apparently viewed them, our own opinion of
the best course to follow (or of the least undesirable choice),
differs substantially from the opinion of the lower court. Alternatively, we will reverse the trial court if appellant's counsel by
argument to the record can persuade us, under a clearly erroneous standard, that the trial court's view of the true facts of the
case was flawed, and that such distorted view likely affected the
judge's opinion.
I leave as an exercise to the reader the determination whether the
North Dakota Supreme Court hews rather more closely to the second
alternative than the first in reviewing the issues in domestic cases mentioned previously, notwithstanding its public avowal of the first alternative
(or its "findings of fact . . . clearly erroneous" equivalent). But whatever
test the court purports to use, I submit that its decision-making process
would be clarified and better assisted by counsel if it openly recognized
39. Indeed, in my view, this "rational basis- test may be what theNorth Dakota Supreme Court
actually has in mind as being appropriate for certain issues in domestic cases, although it expresses
the test in terms of issues which involve "matters of fact" and which consequently are subject to
review only under a "clearly erroneous" standard. It may be that the court adopted the reasoning that
certain issues in domestic cases involved matters of fact, not because the issues seemed similar to a
dispute of the "in which direction was the light red?" variety, but because the court wanted to cleave
to, or thought it wanted to cleave to, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review which is conjoined
with the "finding of fact" label. To be sure, the court could have attained very much the same result
by saying that in such matters the trial judge has wide discretion and will be reversed only for an
abuse of that discretion, but no doubt when it comes to a highly emotional subject like that of child
custody, any court would be reluctant to say something so chilling and apparently cavalier.
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and took into account that many times the proper resolution of such
issues is essentially a matter of opinion.
VI.

CODA.

In conclusion, and in repetition, we make too much ado about the
supposed distinction between "fact" and "law." Music provides a fitting
analogy for the view we ought to take of the interaction between law and
fact. Law and fact can be likened to the melody and the rhythm which
unite to make a musical piece. Conceptually they are distinct, but rhythm
without a tune is only the sound of clockwork, and the best known melody
in the world would be unrecognizable if its notes and rests were sounded
for a wide variety of randomly chosen time values. Therefore, although
we may choose to emphasize and study the rhythm in one musical piece,
or the tune in another, it is futile to attempt to completely divorce the
tune from the beat.
Similarly, it is futile to attempt to completely divorce issues of fact
from issues of law. Instead, we should recognize the wisdom disguised in
the old bromide: "The Law is a Seamless Web."

